Mobile sensor nodes are an ideal solution for efficiently collecting measurements for a variety of applications. Mobile sensor nodes offer a particular advantage when measurements must be made in hazardous and/or adversarial environments. When mobile sensor nodes must operate in hostile environments, it would be advantageous for them to be able to avoid undesired interactions with hostile elements. It is also of interest for the mobile sensor node to maintain low-observability in order to avoid detection by hostile elements. Conventional path-planning strategies typically attempt to plan a path by optimizing some performance metric. The problem with this approach in an adversarial environment is that it may be relatively simple for a hostile element to anticipate the mobile sensor node's actions (i.e. optimal paths are also often predictable paths). Such information could then be leveraged to exploit the mobile sensor node. Furthermore, dynamic adversarial environments are typically characterized by high-uncertainty and highcomplexity that can make synthesizing paths featuring adequate performance very difficult. The goal of this work is to develop a path-planner anchored in info-gap decision theory, capable of generating non-deterministic paths that satisfy predetermined performance requirements in the face of uncertainty surrounding the actions of the hostile element(s) and/or the environment. This type of path-planner will inherently make use of the time-tested security technique of varying paths and changing routines while taking into account the current state estimate of the environment and the uncertainties associated with it. (Approved for unlimited public release, LA-UR 12-01488) 
INTRODUCTION
The benefits of mobile sensor nodes have become clear over the course of the last decade [1] . They can collect data efficiently over long periods of time in environments that are inaccessible to humans such as in the air [2] or under the sea [3] . As costs of mobile sensor node components decrease, control and perception software becomes more mature, and capabilities increase, many more applications for mobile sensor nodes will open up. In many situations mobile sensor nodes will have the physical capability to inflict damage on their environment. These mobile sensor nodes may also be "authorized" to access, observe and record freely in locations where sensitive intellectual property is stored or generated. Significant damage could result if an adversarial agent gained control over a trusted mobile sensor node possessing such characteristics. Mobile sensor nodes clearly present unique security challenges that stem from their coupled cyber-physical nature.
Often mobile sensor nodes are required to traverse an environment unattended to visit a number of "goal points." The purpose of arriving at these goal points may be to make measurements at those points, download measurements to a server, refuel, or receive maintenance. While the mobile sensor node is traversing this environment unattended it is vulnerable to exploitation by adversarial agents. Adversarial agents may attempt to steal or damage the sensor node and its payload. They may try to tamper with its data or software. They might even reconfigure the mobile sensor node to act as a Trojan horse to cause damage when it arrives back at its home base. Discussions with Los Alamos National Laboratory staff with experience operating in hostile environments [4] have revealed that one of the most effective techniques for avoiding tampering by unfriendly agents is to operate in as unpredictable a manner as possible. A very effective technique for remaining unpredictable is by varying routes and changing routines. Conventional control policies for mobile sensor nodes that minimize time or energy consumption may be relatively simple for an intelligent adversary to observe, learn and anticipate. By observing the actions of the mobile sensor node, the adversary would be able to construct a model of the mobile sensor node's control policy, and then devise a strategy to take advantage of that policy. If, however, the mobile sensor node employs paths that exhibit an element of randomness to them, it will be much more difficult for an adversary to be able to devise a control policy model to exploit the mobile sensor node. An alternative strategy is to generate random paths that are unknown to the adversarial observer. Generating random paths is a relatively simple task, but doing so while taking into account various objectives and hazards in the environment is somewhat more difficult. It is also very common for adversarial environments to exhibit large amounts of uncertainty in the state estimate. Given a high amount of uncertainty, it may be the case that it is preferable to select a path that is robust to uncertainty at the cost of performance. The goal of this work is to present a novel path-planning technique for generating random, admissible paths that pass through the required goal points while demonstrating robustness to uncertainties in the environment. This work will make use of info-gap decision theory to analyze the tradeoffs between robustness and performance for a set of randomly generated paths for a mobile sensor node operating in an uncertain, adversarial environment.
BACKGROUND
Over the course of the last few years the need for improved cyber-physical security for mobile sensor nodes has been pointed out multiple times. The 2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap specifically points out that protecting ground-based mobile sensor nodes from tampering is a high priority: "Of particular note among ground systems is the requirement for anti-tampering. In no other environment is an unmanned system more vulnerable to human tampering than when on the ground." [1] The 2011 Unmanned Ground Systems Roadmap identifies technology needs such as a "Render Useless Mechanism." Such a mechanism could be important to destroy data or hardware that could damage the interests of the mobile sensor node owner in the event that it falls under adversarial control. It also mentions the need for a "Layered Escalating Defense Mechanisms," which are described as a "non-lethal, intrusion prevention, and layered, escalating self-defense capability." [5] .
Thus far, despite the call for the technology, relatively few research efforts have directly attempted to address the cyber-physical security issues that affect mobile sensor nodes. The problem of protecting an autonomous car-like robot from attacks based on the Precision Immobilization Technique (PIT maneuver) was initially explored by Mascareñas [6] . The somewhat related problem of identifying cyber-physical security weaknesses in a modern automobile has also been explored [7] . Over the last decade, domestic-task robots have begun to make a debut in homes. The cyber-physical security issues surrounding these devices were studied by [8] . Denning points out in her presentation that attacks against computing systems tend to lag behind the technology. Given this observation, and the growth of mobile sensor node applications, now is the time to begin to address the cyber-physical security challenges that will arise from mobile sensor node use.
ROBUST, NON-DETERMINISTIC PATH PLANNING OVERVIEW
The goal of this research effort is to develop a technique for helping ensure the cyber-physical security of unattended mobile sensor nodes in hazardous and potentially hostile environments. Generally, mobile sensor nodes need to plan paths through these environments in such a way that they meet certain objectives (e.g. visit "goal points"). Every candidate transversal path has a performance associated with it that is a function of the trajectory of the path and the state of the environment (i.e. penalty severity/location, reward location, path length, etc.). One key challenge with operating in these environments is that often the state estimate of the environment features a high level of uncertainty. Any path used to traverse the goal points in the environment should maintain a suitable level of performance even if the actual environment varies in a significant manner from the state estimate of the environment. This problem is further complicated when the environment is populated with adversarial agents that might try to anticipate the path followed by the mobile sensor node in order to exploit it by theft or tampering. In order to address this problem, a two stage approach has been developed. The first step is to generate a series of kinematically admissible paths that pass through all the required goal points. The second step is to apply info-gap decision theory to analyze these paths, taking into account the uncertain state estimate of the environment, and selecting a path that exhibits the most robustness to this uncertainty. It is important to note here that from the point of view of implementing info-gap decision theory, the set of paths can be generated in any conceivable manner. They may be optimal in some sense, they could be generated manually (i.e. by a human), or they may even be generated in a random fashion. For the purpose of this work, the main concern is generating paths that will help make the mobile sensor node robust to theft and tampering by adversarial agents. In order for an adversarial agent to physically steal or tamper with a mobile sensor node, it must first determine where the sensor node is located. Throughout this work, we are primarily concerned with generating paths that are penalized when they are in some sense "observed." The environments discussed throughout this work will feature penalty regions. These regions can be interpreted as areas over which the mobile sensor node has a high probability of being observed. The ultimate goal of this work is to generate paths that exhibit low-observability. For this reason, and based on conversations with White [4] , it has been determined that an appropriate strategy for path generation is to use randomly generated paths that meet the kinematic constraints of the mobile sensor node and pass through the goal points. Randomly varying the paths and changing routines will frustrate attempts by adversarial agents to "lie-in-wait" to ensnare the mobile sensor node. This type of path-planner will inherently make use of the time-tested physical security technique of varying paths and changing routines, while taking into account the current state estimate of the environment and the uncertainties associated with it.
NON-DETERMINISTIC PATH PLANNING ALGORITHM FOR THE DUBINS CAR
For the purpose of this work, we focus on generating unpredictable paths for a mobile sensor node featuring a Dubins car chassis. A Dubins car is a car-like vehicle that can only travel forward and features a minimum turning radius. A detailed description of the Dubins car can be found in [9] . The process used to generate random paths is illustrated in Figure 1 . The environment consists of an initial mobile sensor node location, a set of goal points, and a set of penalties. Note that the analysis can be trivially extended to include a set of rewards (e.g. "safe zones") as well. The goal points are points through which the car must pass in order for the path to be admissible. The centers of the yellow circles are used to represent goal point locations, and the penalties in the environment are represented by red circles (see Figure 1 ). The radius of the circles represents the nominal radius of influence of the penalty. The random path-planning algorithm must generate random paths that pass through each of the goal points once while respecting the kinematic constraints of a Dubins car with a fixed minimum turning radius.
The first step for generating a random path is to select a random ordering of the goal point locations. The mobile sensor node will then visit the goal points in this random order. The next step is to generate a series of line segments. The first line segment starts at the initial position of the mobile sensor node and connects to the first goal point. The second line segment begins at the 1 st goal point and ends at the second goal point. This pattern is repeated until no goal points remain. The next step is to generate a series of ordered intermediary pseudo-goal points that are spaced in a user-defined manner along the length of each of the line segments. Each point is offset normally from the line segment by a distance determined by a draw from a uniform distribution with a user defined variance. Finally the minimum-length Dubins path is calculated for each successive pair of the ordered points. The final angular pose of the car at each point is a free variable that is selected so that the Dubins car is pointed toward the next successive goal point when it reaches the current goal point. As a consequence, in the case of the final goal point, all that is required is that the car drives in a straight line from the second-to-last goal point to the final goal point. The final angular pose is such that the car is aligned with the line going through the last point and the second-to-last point. Finally, in order to facilitate the calculation of the performance/cost function along the path, additional intermediary points are generated along the path. Figure 2 shows an example of a randomly generated path that respects the kinematic constraints of a Dubins car, while still passing through all the goal points. It is important to note that at this stage of the analysis, no concern is paid to the nature and locations of the penalties. At this point the only real requirement is that the paths be admissible in the sense that the mobile sensor node is physically capable of executing the paths. From a practical point of view however, it is generally wise to discard randomly generated paths that possess blatantly poor performance. To illustrate, in this work, a simple-to-calculate nominal performance value is calculated for each path, for the theoretical case of no uncertainty in the environment. If the nominal performance of a randomly generated path falls below a user-defined threshold, the path is discarded and a new path is generated. The nominal performance of the new path is then calculated and the process is repeated. This procedure is followed until the number of paths desired by the user is generated. For the case where there are obstacles in the environment care should be taken to ensure that none of the paths pass through these obstacles. The random path generation algorithm described above can be extended to ensure the mobile sensor node does not pass through obstacles, but this extension will not be further discussed in this work. Generally, in the course of selecting a single suitable random path, a multitude of random paths will be generated. Once the paths are generated, the next step is to apply info-gap decision theory to each path in order to determine which is most robust to uncertainty in the environment, for a given minimum required performance. 
INFO-GAP DECISION THEORY
Conventional path planning strategies are based on minimizing some quantity such as time or energy. The problem with using this strategy in uncertain environments featuring adversarial agents is that optimal paths will have a tendency to be somewhat predictable. Predictable paths will facilitate exploitation of the mobile sensor node by adversarial agents. Alternatively, a completely random, unpredictable path could be generated, but it would most likely produce a path that would be of little practical utility. A more suitable solution would be a random path that happens to successfully complete some task or collect some reward. Furthermore, this random path should exhibit robustness to uncertainty in the state estimate of the environment. This characteristic will be vital for dealing with hazardous, highly uncertain environments. To address this problem we turn to info-gap decision theory [10] .
Info-gap decision theory aims to facilitate decision-making in the face of uncertainty by answering three questions: (1) "What is the decision that needs to be made?" (2) "What is the uncertainty that affects the quality of this decision?" (3) "How is the quality of this decision quantified?" For the problem at hand, the decision that needs to be made is how the mobile sensor node will proceed through the environment, given the myriad paths from which to choose. This decision is not obvious, given the objective of maintaining unpredictability vis-à-vis randomly-generated paths. Complicating the issue is the uncertainty in the environment and in particular, uncertainty in the location, level, and radius of influence of the penalties located throughout the environment, which can have a dramatic effect on the viability of a particular path. To address the third question, there are two objectives that affect the quality of a particular decision (i.e. path): (1) the reward function associated with the environment and (2) the interaction of the mobile sensor node with adversarial agents. For the simulation discussed in the following sections, the mobile sensor node does not receive any rewards, but it is trivial to include a variety of rewards such as reward regions or point rewards (e.g. powering stations). Thus, a path's robustness to environmental uncertainty is synonymous with its insensitivity to changes in the environment.
To quantify the above paragraph, the following two equations are presented: an info-gap model of uncertainty (Equation (1)) and a robustness function (Equation (2)).
(1) (2) Equation (1) provides a description of the uncertainty in the parameters, for each of the penalties in the environment. The uncertainty in these parameters is bounded and is dependent upon the values of ̃ and . As is permitted to increase, the set ( ) allows for wider bounds on the uncertain parameters admitting a wider variety of environments against which to assess path performance. To assess the robustness of a particular path to uncertainty , Equation (2) is employed. This equation consists of two parts: an inner minimum and an outer maximum. The inner minimum represents the worst-case performance of a path ( ), given the uncertainty in the penalties described by Equation (1). While analytical solutions may be available for some problems of interest, the function ( ) offers no such convenience. Therefore, in order to evaluate ( ), we begin by assuming a value of . This permits us to then sample the set ( ), which is analogous to generating a set of uncertain environments, whose penalty parameters are constrained by the Equation (1) and our assumed value of . We then evaluate the performances of each path, operating within each of these uncertain environments, and extract the minimum performances of the paths. Note that strictly speaking, a "worst-case performance" does not exist in info-gap decision theory, as is an unbounded quantity. However, it is admissible to employ such terminology when referring to fixed values of (i.e. "the minimum performance at " is analogous to "the worst-case performance at "). The outer maximum then represents the maximum uncertainty for which the minimum performance of path is greater than some threshold value . A hypothetical example of the result of such an assessment is given in Figure 3 , where the worst-case performances of three paths are plotted for various levels of uncertainty . For the hypothetical example, path is the desired path in the absence of uncertainty. However, as uncertainty in the environment is admitted, path and eventually path become the desired paths. It is noted that in general, a threshold on performance (i.e.
) would be prescribed. However, the following discussion assumes no such threshold, instead focusing on the full robustness curves generated by the simulation. 
DUBINS CAR SIMULATION FEATURING INFO-GAP ANALYSIS
A numerical simulation was developed in order to demonstrate the capabilities of the random-path/info-gap path-planning technique. A representative environment spanning 300x300 arbitrary length units was generated, complete with goal points and penalty regions as shown in Figure 4 . The technique can be extended trivially to incorporate regions of reward as well, but for the sake of simplicity only regions of penalty will be considered in this work. Each penalty has a radius of influence of 20 arbitrary length units and impacts the performance function by -10.0 points. The uncertainty on the x-y location and radius of influence of each penalty is 5 arbitrary length units.
A total of 10 Dubins paths that passed through all the goal points were randomly generated. intermediary random pseudo-goal points would be generated every 30 arbitrary length units in order to add additional uncertainty to the path. The tangential offset from the straight-line path between goal points was selected by performing independent draws from a uniform distribution with a width of 75 arbitrary length units. Finally, intermediary points were generated every 20 length units. The minimum turning radius of the Dubins car was set to 5 arbitrary length units. A constraint was placed on the Dubins paths such that each path must possess a nominal performance of no less than -100. The set of the resulting 10 Dubins paths can be seen in Figure 5 . When calculating the performance of a path, 1.0 performance point is subtracted for each additional intermediary point the path traverses. This subtraction from the path performance causes longer paths to have a lower performance. The idea is that when energy consumption is important there is a bias for shorter paths. For cases where longer paths might give the mobile sensor node more opportunity to collect data, this bias can be reversed to encourage longer paths. The bias can be set to 0 when randomness in the path is the most important consideration. Once the paths were generated, an info-gap decision theory analysis was applied to each path with respect to the given environment (i.e. Equations (1) and (2) were evaluated). The resulting robustness curves are given in Figure 6 . The first thing to notice is that at no uncertainty (α = 0), none of the paths exhibit a performance that is less than -100.0, as specified by the user. It is also clear that in many instances the robustness curves cross. These crossing points indicate uncertainty levels at which one path begins to outperform another path as the uncertainty increases or decreases. That is, the preference reverses from one path to another, because the newly preferred path offers greater performance than the old path at higher levels of uncertainty. Some of the more interesting paths will now be examined in more depth. First, consider path 8. Path 8 is shown in Figure 7 and its associated robustness curve is shown in Figure 8 . Path 8 is the path with the nominally highest performance. This is not surprising since path 8 has no intermediary point that falls within the nominal radius of a penalty. Path 8 generally does a good job of avoiding penalties, but it does come very close to three of the penalties. As the uncertainty increases, the minimal performance of path 8 begins to degrade. This degradation can be attributed to the fact that path 8 comes very close to four of the penalties. In this sense, the performance of path 8 is somewhat unstable with respect to uncertainty. Small changes in the penalty value, location and radius of influence can have a substantial effect on the minimal performance. The robustness curve for path 8 crosses with the robustness curves for path 3, path 6, and path 7. When α ranges from 0 to 0.7, path 8 goes from being the highest ranked path to being only the 4 th ranked performing path. Path 8 is a good example of a randomly generated path that exhibits high nominal performance, but is not robust to uncertainty, relative to some of the alternative paths.
The next path of interest is path 3 as shown in Figure 9 . The robustness curve for path 3 is shown in Figure 10 . At no uncertainty, path 3 is ranked third out of ten paths. For comparison purposes, path 8 has the highest nominal performance at -60.0 and path 4 has the lowest nominal performance with a value of -98.0. Path 3 has a nominal performance of -69.0 so its performance is 24% lower than the best nominally performing (or deterministically speaking, "most preferable") path. A conventional analysis that does not take into account uncertainty in the environment may deem this path unfavorable. However, a closer inspection of the robustness curves shown in Figure 10 reveals a potentially beneficial property of path 3. First note that the robustness curve of path 3 is more vertical than the other robustness curves. In general, the more vertical a path's robustness curve is, the more robust that particular path is to uncertainty in the environment. Once α reaches 0.3, path 3 becomes the preferred path. Then briefly path 3 crosses path 6 when α reaches 0.4. Then from α equals 0.5 to 1.0, path 3 remains the most favorable path. Even for the brief period at which path 6 is the most favorable path, path 3 is still the second most favorable path. Path 3 is an excellent example of a path that may appear to have lackluster nominal performance, but exhibits robust performance in the face of uncertainty in the environment. The reason path 3 exhibits robustness can be inferred by examining Figure 9 . Generally path 3 stays fairly far away from the penalties' radii of influence. On the rare occasions that the path must approach a penalty area, such as the case for the middle-right-hand side goal point, the path assumes a head on approach toward the penalty, and then makes an equally hasty retreat from the penalty once it reaches its goal; it is reiterated that this
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Robustness Curves, mm nominal performance = -100 Path 8 Robustness Curves, mm nominal performance = -100 behavior is purely by chance, given the fact that the paths are randomly generated. When uncertainty in the location, severity and radius of influence of the penalty are accounted for during the info-gap analysis, the penalty still has limited effect on the path performance, because the path has so few intermediary points in the vicinity of the radius of influence of the penalty. Path 3 could be a very good choice for a path when operating in adversarial environments with moderateto-high uncertainty. Finally, consider path 2 as shown in Figure 11 . From a nominal performance perspective, path 2 ranks 5 th of 10 with a nominal performance of -84.0. The low nominal performance of path 2 can be attributed to the fact that it passes through the center of one of the penalties. The robustness of path 2 to uncertainty is also quite poor. Its robustness curve tends farther to the left than almost all the other robustness curves with perhaps the exception of path 9 which has the worst overall performance. Path 2 goes from the 5 th ranked path at α = 0 to the 9 th ranked path at α = 1. Paths 1, 5, 10 and 4 all outperform path 2 as α increases. The explanation for path 2's poor robustness characteristics is clearly seen in Figure 11 . Path 2 often assumes a trajectory nearly tangent to the radius of influence of the penalties. As a result, as α increases and the location, severity, and radius of influence of the penalties are perturbed, a large fraction of path 2's intermediary points begin to fall within the radius of influence of the penalties and the performance degrades at a significantly higher rate, relative to some of the alternative paths. In the preceding examples, info-gap decision theory was used to provide valuable insight into both the nominal performance of a path with respect to a state estimate of an environment, as well as the robustness characteristics of a path as uncertainty in the state estimate of the environment increases. The environment used in these examples only contained penalty regions, but it is trivial to also include regions of reward. It is important to note however that as the environment is populated with both reward and penalty regions it becomes harder for a human to develop an intuition for which paths may be more preferable than others as uncertainty increases. This is where the strength of an automated info-gap decision theory analysis becomes apparent. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The primary goal of this work is to introduce a novel technique for generating non-deterministic, lowobservability paths that accomplish user-defined goals. This approach couples a non-deterministic path generator with info-gap decision theory analysis as a tool for selecting paths that help mobile sensor nodes ensure their own selfpreservation in potentially hazardous environments, featuring adversarial agents. In this work, randomly generated paths were generated in order to enable mobile sensor nodes to operate in a manner that is unpredictable by adversarial agents. These random paths were then subjected to an info-gap analysis with respect to an uncertain environment to evaluate their performance at varying levels of uncertainty. Future work will look at generating paths that exhibit varying degrees of randomness while taking advantage of a significant portion of the kino-dynamic capabilities of the mobile sensor node. This work can be directly applied to the problem of directing a mobile sensor node to randomly visit waypoints in order to frustrate attempts to exploit, steal or tamper-with its cyber-physical systems. Ensuring the cyber-physical security of unattended mobile sensor nodes will become a key challenge that must be addressed in order to encourage the widespread use of mobile sensor nodes. This work is an initial step toward building cyber-physically secure mobile sensor nodes.
